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I. INTRODUCTION
A specter of liability looms over American publishers as they move further and
further into the physically borderless world of Internet publication.1 While the American
press has long enjoyed heightened First Amendment protection from defamation2
lawsuits domestically, the First Amendment

abroad is "nothing more than a local

statute”3 and free speech norms are substantially less robust internationally than in the
United States. Most significantly, foreign defamation standards do not require that a
defamatory statement be accompanied by “actual malice”— knowledge that the statement
was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not— for recovery, as
required in the United States pursuant to the watershed Supreme Court case of New York
Times v. Sullivan.4
This substantive conflict of laws would be of little practical significance were
foreign courts unable to reach the merits of an Internet defamation case for lack of
jurisdiction.

Indeed, American courts have been disinclined to assert personal

jurisdiction over Internet defamation defendants unless their allegedly defamatory
statements were posted to websites whose content was intentionally directed toward

1
See Digital Equip. Corp. v. Altavista Tech., Inc., 960 F. Supp. 456, 462 (D. Mass. 1997) (The Internet has
no territorial boundaries. To paraphrase Gertrude Stein, as far as the Internet is concerned, not only is there
perhaps “no there there,” the “there” is everywhere where there is Internet access.) (citations omitted).
2
Defamation is defined as any communication that “tends so to harm the reputation of another as to lower
him in the estimation of the community or to deter third persons from associating or dealing with him,”
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS 559 (1977), but truth is a defense to liability, see id. 581A. Defamation
may occurs as either libel and slander. Libel generally covers written or printed defamation, while slander
generally covers oral defamation, but the distinction is not always easy to make. See id. 568 cmt. b. The
modern practice has been to combine libel and slander under the common tort of defamation. However,
commentators have suggested that defamation on the Internet is best classified as libel, principally because
an electronic message can always be printed. See, e.g., Terri A. Cutrera, Computer Networks, Libel and the
First Amendment, 11 Computer/L.J. 555, 562 (1992)
3
Stephan Wilske & Teresa Schiller, International Jurisdiction in Cyberspace: Who May Regulate the
Internet?, 50 FED. COMM. L.J. 117, 177 (1997).
4
376 U.S. 254 (1964).

individuals and/or locations within the forum state.5 Moreover, in the U.S., the fact that a
newspaper’s website can be accessed in a forum state “does not by itself demonstrate that
a newspaper [is] intentionally directing website content . . . to a [particular] audience.”6
A less constrained approach to jurisdiction in the Internet defamation context,
however, one that places many American publishers squarely in the crosshairs, is
developing internationally. Two recent cases, both involving the American media giant
Dow Jones,7 embody this approach: In Dow Jones & Company, Inc. v. Gutnick,8 the
Australian High Court asserted jurisdiction over a defamation claim based on material
that was placed on the Internet by Dow Jones & Co. outside of Australian borders but
viewed within. Similarly, in Harrods, Ltd. v. Dow Jones & Co.,9 the High Court of
Justice in London, citing Gutnick as persuasive authority, found that “the apparently
limited number of hits emanating from this jurisdiction on the relevant page of [Dow
Jones’s] web site” was sufficient to create jurisdiction.
Together, these cases represent a lowering of the jurisdictional barrier that might
otherwise shield American Internet publishers from exposure to legal standards of
defamation less sensitive to free press interests than the American standard.

They

suggest an unbounded rule of jurisdiction for Internet defamation, one that subjects an
individual or entity that publishes on the Internet to the laws of any locale where content
5

See Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc., 952 F. Supp. 1119, 1124 (W.D. Pa. 1997) (“A passive
website that does little more than make information available to those who are interested in it is not
grounds for the exercise of personal jurisdiction.”); Revell v. Lidov, 317 F.3d 467 (5th Cir. 2002)
(characterizing a journal website as passive in nature and holding that it did not give rise to personal
jurisdiction where an individual posted an allegedly defamatory article to it). See also discussion infra Part
II for a comparison of the three major approaches to jurisdiction taken by U.S. courts.
6
Young v. New Haven Advocate, 315 F.3d 256, 258 (4th Cir. 2002) (emphasis added).
7
The flagship publication of Dow Jones is the Wall Street Journal, founded in 1889, with a current
international circulation of approximately 2.1 million. See generally
http://www.dowjones.com/TheCompany/AboutDowJones.htm (last visited Jan. 2, 2005).
8
[2002] HCA 56 (10 December 2002) (Austl. High Court).
9
[2003] EWHC 1162 (QB) (22 May 2003).
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can be viewed, which is, by virtue of the Internet’s pervasive reach, nearly anywhere and
everywhere in the world.10
This Article will examine the difficult jurisdictional issues which arise in the
course of all Internet defamation claims as well as the substantive conflicts of law thrown
into relief by international Internet defamation claims such as the Dow Jones cases. Part
II will describe analyses used by American courts to address the question of jurisdiction
generally and in the Internet context specifically. Part III will describe the Victorian
Supreme Court and Australian High Court opinions in Dow Jones & Co., Inc. v. Gutnick
and argue that the approach to internet defamation jurisdiction taken by those courts is
irreconcilable with the American approach. In addition, it will outline the substantive
conflicts that have arisen between U.S. and Australian/English laws of defamation as a
result of Sullivan and its progeny. Part IV will address a question that inevitably arises
when foreign courts render judgments incompatible with American constitutional
standards of free speech: When may an American court refuse to enforce a foreign
judgment counter to public policy? Absent a political solution, this Article will argue,
American courts may be increasingly called upon to exercise this discretionary power to
counter international threats to American free press protections. More generally, this
Article will conclude that American courts, the Supreme Court in particular, will need to
unequivocally reaffirm the values embodied by New York Times v. Sullivan and transpose

10

See ACLU v. Reno, 217 F.3d 162, 169 (3rd Cir. 2000), vacated by Ashcroft v. ACLU, 535 U.S. 564
(2002) (“[T]he Internet has an “international, geographically-borderless nature,” and “with the proper
software every Website is accessible to all other Internet users worldwide.”). See also Christopher W.
Meyer, World Wide Web Advertising: Personal Jurisdiction Around the Whole Wide World?, 54 WASH &
LEE L. REV. 1269 (1997).
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those values to the Internet context in order to prevent the further erosion of American
free speech norms in cyberspace.
II. U.S. APPROACHES TO INTERNET JURISDICTION
A. Traditional Bases for Jurisdiction
In order for a U.S. court to exercise jurisdiction over a civil dispute, there must be
a nexus between the persons or property involved and the forum. That is, a court
generally must have either in personam jurisdiction or in rem jurisdiction.11
Controversies involving Internet publishers generally revolve around questions of in
personam jurisdiction, as plaintiffs ask courts to exercise personal jurisdiction over
defendants physically located outside state or national boundaries.
In addition, most difficult questions of Internet jurisdiction are concerned with the
application of specific jurisdiction, as opposed to general jurisdiction.12

General

jurisdiction is conferred where a defendant has maintained “continuous and systematic
contacts”13 with the forum, and the standard is high, requiring “contacts with the state
that approximate physical presence.”14 Courts have rarely found general jurisdiction
based solely on Internet conduct.15 Specific jurisdiction, on the other hand, permits a
court to exercise personal jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant where the activity of
a defendant in the forum falls within the “minimum contacts” framework articulated by

11

REDISH ET AL.,CIVIL PROCEDURE 145 (2003).
See Nathan A. Olin , The A-B-CS of Targeting: A Formula for Resolving Personal JurisdictionInternet Issues (“Courts have almost universally rejected the argument that merely entering cyberspace by
putting up a web-site permits general jurisdiction over the site creator.”).
13
Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414–15 (1984).
14
Bancroft & Masters, Inc. v. Augusta Nat'l, Inc., 223 F.3d 1082, 1086 (9th Cir. 2000).
15
But see Gator.com Corp. v. L.L. Bean, Inc., 34 F.3d 1072, 1075 (9th Cir. 2003) (finding that general
jurisdiction existed over L.L. Bean based on its “extensive marketing and sales in California, its extensive
contacts with California vendors, and the fact that . . . its website is clearly and deliberately structured to
operate as a sophisticated virtual store in California.”).
12
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the Supreme Court in International Shoe Co. v. Washington,16 described below. The
overwhelming majority of disputes raising questions of jurisdiction based on Internet
websites involve analyses of specific jurisdiction.17
U.S. courts exercise specific jurisdiction over conduct occurring outside the forum
state only where jurisdiction is proper under the applicable “long-arm” statute18 and
consistent with constitutional due process. The long-arm statutes of most American
States, however, typically permit jurisdiction to the extent permitted by due process, so
that “the statutory inquiry . . . merges with the constitutional inquiry, and the two
inquiries essentially become one.”19 Courts employ a two-prong specific jurisdiction
analysis. Under the first prong, the courts must examine the quality and quantity of the
defendant’s contacts with the forum.20 That is, courts must first evaluate “how numerous
and deliberate the defendant's contacts with the forum state were.”21 The second prong of
the test requires the courts to determine the reasonableness of asserting jurisdiction over
the foreign defendant.22 The court must ask whether the exercise of jurisdiction by the
forum would offend “traditional conceptions of fair play and substantial justice.”23 A
defendant's contacts must rise to the level “that he should reasonably anticipate being
haled into court there.”24

16

326 U.S. 310 (1945).
See COMPUTER LAW §3D.03 (2)(b) (2004) (“The vast majority of Internet jurisdiction cases deal with
specific jurisdiction.”).
18
Id.
19
Stover v O’Connell Associates, Inc, 84 F 3d 132, 135–6 (4th Cir., 1996).
20
See Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 472–78 (1985) (explaining first prong of analysis)
21
Id. at 475–76 nn. 17–18.
22
World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 295 (1980).
23
Int’l Shoe., 326 U.S. at 320 (1945).
24
World-Wide Volkswagen , 444 U.S. at 297 (describing “gestalt factors” that must be analyzed when
evaluating fairness of asserting personal jurisdiction).
17
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B. The Modern Test for Personal Jurisdiction: “Minimum Contacts”
The contemporary standard for evaluating a defendant’s contacts with the forum
state was announced in the landmark decision International Shoe Co. v. Washington.25 In
International Shoe, the Supreme Court created an exception to the requirement of
physical presence within a specific forum26 in order for personal jurisdiction to attach,
requiring instead that a defendant have “certain minimum contacts with . . . [a forum
state] such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend ‘traditional notions of fair
play and substantial justice.’”27 “Minimum contacts” have been defined as “conduct and
connection with the forum . . . such that [the defendant] should reasonably anticipate
being haled into court there.”28 In determining whether minimum contacts exist, courts
look for “some act by which the defendant purposefully avails itself of the privilege of
conducting activities within the forum State, thus invoking the benefits and protections of
its laws.”29 Courts continue to rely on the minimum contacts analysis of International
Shoe and its progeny30 as they analyze the question of whether certain Internet activities,
including Internet publishing, form a basis for personal jurisdiction.31

25

326 U.S. 310 (1945).
Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 614 (1877) (requiring physical presence in a forum state as a predicate for the
exercise of personal jurisdiction).
27
Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316 (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)) (emphasis added).
28
World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 291 (1980).
29
Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958).
30
See, e.g., id (holding “general” jurisdiction exists when a nonresident defendant’s contact with the forum
state are “continuous and systematic”); Burger King Corp., 471 U.S. 462 at 475 (1985) (holding “specific
jurisdiction” exists when a nonresident defendant has “purposefully availed itself of the privilege of
conducting activities within the forum State, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws”).
31
See, e.g., Hinsch v. Outrigger Hotels Haw., 153 F. Supp. 2d 209, 213–14 (E.D.N.Y. 2001) (“[T]he court
addresses and dismisses Plaintiff's argument that all cases from 1958 to 1990 are irrelevant in light of
changing times. In the absence of a change in the law, the cases cited by the court remain the law to apply
here. This is true even if changes in technology, such as the use of the internet instead of a telephone, have
altered the way in which business is conducted.”)
26
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C. Approaches to Jurisdiction in Internet Defamation Cases
As of 2005, the U.S. Supreme Court has yet to specifically address the issue of
personal jurisdiction with respect to Internet activities.32 However, a number of U.S.
district and circuit courts have. Three closely related approaches to the jurisdictional
question, sometimes in tension, but often used in conjunction, can be identified and are
outlined below.
1. The Zippo Sliding-Scale Approach
Although not a case involving Internet defamation, Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot
Com, Inc.33 is a cornerstone in the jurisprudence to date involving jurisdiction based on
an Internet website.34 In Zippo, the defendant owned and operated a website containing
information about defendant, ads and an application for a news service. To access the
news service, viewers of the website were required to complete an online application and
pay a fee by credit card.35 Although the defendant’s employees, offices, and servers were
outside the forum state, two percent of the subscribers to its website were residents of the
state and the defendant entered into agreements with seven Internet access providers in
the state so that subscribers there could access the news service.36 In addition, the

32

See Brian E. Daughdrill, Personal Jurisdiction and the Internet: Waiting for the Other Shoe to Drop on
First Amendment Concerns, 51 MERCER L. REV.. 919, 919-20 (2000) (Courts attempting to impose
traditional personal jurisdiction analysis on Internet-related contacts have no guidance from the Supreme
Court and continue to reach inconsistent results as they attempt to force territorial-based analysis onto a
one- dimensional universe lacking any concept of boundaries, territories, or other physical properties.”).
33
952 F. Supp. 1119 (1997).
34
Toys “R” Us, Inc. v. Step Two, S.A., 318 F.3d 446, 452 (3rd Cir. 2003) (“The opinion in Zippo . . . has
become a seminal authority regarding personal jurisdiction based upon the operation of an Internet web
site.”); Patrick J. Borchers, Internet Libel: The Consequences of a Non-Rule Based Approach to Personal
Juridiction, 98 NW. U.L. REV. 473, 478 (“The opinion in Zippo “has earned a place in history as one of the
most-cited district court opinions ever. As of October 2, 2003, Zippo had been cited an astonishing 570
times, including 67 opinions that are described as following it and 320 times by law review articles.”).
35
Zippo, 952 F. Supp. at 1123.
36
Id.
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defendant owned domain names incorporating plaintiff's trademark. Plaintiff sued for
trademark infringement and related causes.37
Citing the traditional rule that the exercise of specific jurisdiction is proper “when
an entity intentionally reaches beyond its boundaries to conduct business with foreign
residents,”38 the federal district court in Zippo concluded that the propriety of exercising
jurisdiction over a website depends on where on a “sliding scale” of commercial
interactivity a website falls.39 The sliding scale encompasses the broad spectrum of
contacts with a forum state that might be created by an Internet website. At one end of
this spectrum, there are commercial websites characterized as “active” by the Zippo
court, through which a defendant “clearly does business over the Internet.”40

At the

other end of the spectrum lie websites characterized as “passive”, on which the defendant
merely posts information or advertising.

According to Zippo, the contacts created by

websites of this nature are never enough to establish jurisdiction.41 In between these two
poles lie “interactive websites” that permit Internet users to exchange information with
the site’s host computer.42 In these cases, the jurisdictional question should be resolved
by analyzing “the level of interactivity and commercial nature” of the information
exchange. 43
Ironically, having articulated this framework for analyzing Internet jurisdiction, in
which so much rides on the characterization of a website, the Zippo opinion does not
clearly identify the website in question as “active”, “passive”, or “interactive”. However,
37

Id.
Id.
39
Id. at 1124.
40
Id.
41
Id. (“[A] passive website that does little more than make information available to those who are
interested in it is not grounds for the exercise of personal jurisdiction.”).
42
Id. at 1124.
43
Id. at 1126.
38
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the Zippo court found substantial the “repeated[] and conscious[]” processing of
subscription orders (approximately 3,000) from Pennsylvania residents as well as
purposeful transmission of electronic messages into the state.44 These actions, along with
the fact that the defendant had established contracts with Internet service providers within
the forum state, were deemed commercial contacts sufficient to confer jurisdiction.45

a. Application of Zippo to Internet Defamation: Revell v. Lidov46
The Zippo test, commonly referred to as a “sliding scale” or, alternatively,
“passive versus active” test, has been applied in the Internet defamation context by
numerous federal courts47 as well as at least one Canadian court.48 The Fifth Circuit case
of Revell v. Lidov49 is a particularly instructive example of the Zippo analysis as applied
to Internet defamation jurisdiction analysis.

The plaintiff in Revell filed a suit for

defamation in Texas based on an article posted on the Columbia Journalism Review
website, operated and maintained in New York.50 The article alleged, among other
things, that the plaintiff, as part of the Reagan Administration, had willfully failed to
prevent the terrorist bombing of Pan Am Flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland in 1988.51

44

Id.
Id.
46
317 F.3d 467 (5th Cir. 2002).
47
See, e.g., id.(finding no jurisdiction where defendant had placed defamatory remarks on its website
accessible in forum state); Barrett v. Catacombs Press, 44 F. Supp. 2d 717, 729 (E.D. Pa. 1999) (same); but
see Blumenthal v. Drudge, 992 F. Supp. 44, 57 (D.D.C. 1998) (finding jurisdiction over columnist who
composed defamatory statements in California, yet made statements available on website accessible in
forum state).
48
Braintech Inc. v. Kostiuk, 1999 ACWSJ Lexis 1924 (British Columbia Court of Appeals 1999) (applying
the Zippo sliding scale analysis and refusing to exercise jurisdiction because bulletin board on which
plaintiff had posted allegedly defamatory material was a '”Zippo-passive'” website).
49
317 F.3d 467.
50
Id.
51
Id. at 468.
45
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Summarily dismissing any argument that it could exercise general jurisdiction
over the defendant,52 the court turned to the more difficult question of specific
jurisdiction. Working within the Zippo framework (over objections by the plaintiff),53 the
court focused solely on the maintenance of the Internet bulletin board where the allegedly
defamatory article was published. Applying the sliding scale, the court determined that
the Columbia University website could note be characterized as entirely passive because
it included a bulletin board with interactive elements.54 The board allowed users to post
information and receive information that others had posted. Given this level of
interactivity, the court concluded, the website fell within the middle ground of the Zippo
continuum.55
In evaluating the quality and extent of the website’s interactivity with Texas, the
Revell court emphasized that neither Columbia University nor the author of the allegedly
defamatory article knew that the subject of the article was living in Texas, and Texas was
not the “geographic focus” of the article.56 The court observed no evidence that the
article published on Columbia’s website was intended to cause harm in Texas.57
Furthermore, Texans were not the principal users of the bulletin board at issue and the
article was not something that would be of special interest to persons living in Texas,

52

Id. at 471 n. 20 (“Irrespective of the sliding scale, the question of general jurisdiction is not difficult here.
Though the maintenance of a website is, in a sense, a continuous presence everywhere in the world, the
cited contacts of Columbia with Texas are not in any way ‘substantial.’). See also text accompanying notes
22–26 for a discussion of general versus specific jurisdiction in the Internet context.
53
317 F.3d at 471 (“Revell urges that, given the uniqueness of defamation claims and their inherent ability
to inflict injury in far-flung jurisdictions, we should abandon the imagery of Zippo. It is a bold but
ultimately unpersuasive argument. Defamation has its unique features, but shares relevant characteristics
with various business torts.”).
54
Id. at 472.
55
Id.
56
This part of the court’s analysis overlaps substantially with another approach, discussed infra Part II.C
(1)(c), sometimes referred to as “targeting” analysis, which seeks to identify the geographic “focal point” of
a defamatory article. See generally Young v. New Haven Advocate, 315 F.3d 256 (4th Cir. 2002).
57
Revell, 317 F.3d at 476.
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i.e., it did not address events that took place in Texas.58 Consequently, the court held that
the website interactivity did not create sufficient minimum contacts with Texas to subject
the defendants to specific jurisdiction in that state under the Zippo test.59
2. Calder v. Jones60 and the “Effects” Test
Though the Revell court specifically cited Zippo as the test used by the Fifth
Circuit in analyzing Internet jurisdiction, it was also careful to acknowledge the potential
applicability of an “effects” analysis, sometimes thought of as distinct from Zippo
analysis,61 but regarded as “but one facet of the ordinary minimum contacts analysis” in
Revell.62 Under an effects test, jurisdiction is created when a non-resident defendant is
engaged in intentional conduct, aimed at the forum state, causing harm that the defendant
knows is likely to be felt in the forum.63 Effects-based analysis can be traced to the
Supreme Court non–Internet defamation case of Calder v. Jones.64
In Calder, the actress Shirley Jones, a resident of California, brought an action for
defamation there against the National Enquirer tabloid, which is headquartered in Florida.
The Supreme Court held that California’s assertion of jurisdiction was proper. In coming
to this conclusion, it observed that the allegedly defamatory story concerned a California
resident whose television career was centered in California.65 Moreover, the Court noted,

58

Id.
Id. at 477.
60
465 U.S. 783 (1983).
61
See generally 2-3D COMPUTER LAW § 3D.03 (breaking down Internet jurisdictional analyses into three
distinct approaches).
62
Revell, 317 F.3d at 473.
63
Id. at 475.
64
465 U.S. 783 (1983).
65
Id. at 784.
59
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the article was largely drawn from California sources, most of its harm was suffered in
California, and the publication had its largest circulation in California.66
Thus, because California was the “focal point both of the story and the harm
suffered” and the tabloid’s story was “aimed at California”, the Court concluded that the
defendant could “reasonably foresee being haled into California court.”67 Jurisdiction in
California was considered appropriate based in part on the effects of defendants’ conduct
in that state.68 Despite this focus on the effects of a defamatory statement, it should be
emphasized that the intentional conduct of the defendant is still critical in an effectsbased analysis. As the Supreme Court in Calder observed: “Petitioners are not charged
with mere untargeted negligence.

Rather, their intentional, and allegedly tortious,

actions were expressly aimed at California.”69 Thus, the Calder effects tests should not
be misconstrued as a test that looks solely to the effects of a defendant’s conduct in
determining whether an exercise of jurisdiction is appropriate. Rather, the effects of an
injury may be regarded as evidence that a defendant aimed its tortious conduct at a
specific jurisdiction and this could “reasonably anticipate being haled into court there.”70
a. Application of the Effects Test to Internet Defamation: Revell Revisited
The Revell court, restating some of the factors it cited in its Zippo analysis,
concluded its case was distinguishable from Calder. It observed that the article written

66

Id. at 785.
Id. at 789.
68
Id.
69
Id.
70
Id. at 789–90 (“Petitioner South wrote and petitioner Calder edited an article that they knew would have
a potentially devastating impact upon respondent. And they knew that the brunt of that injury would be felt
by respondent in the State in which she lives and works and in which the National Enquirer has its largest
circulation. Under the circumstances, petitioners must ‘reasonably anticipate being haled into court there’
to answer for the truth of the statements made in their article.”)(citing World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v.
Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297).
67
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and posted by the defendants in its case contained no reference to Texas, did not refer to
any of the Texas activities of the plaintiff, and was in no way directed at Texas readers.71
By contrast, the defamatory article in Calder “contained descriptions of the California
activities of the plaintiff, drew upon California sources, and found its largest audience in
California”.72

Thus, the Revell court concluded that Calder did not control.73

Nevertheless, as Revell clearly acknowledges, Calder is binding authority and any court
faced with the vexing question of jurisdiction in an Internet defamation case must either
distinguish it or employ its “effects” test.
3. Young v. New Haven Advocate74 and the “Targeting Inquiry”
A number of commentators have advocated an approach that more specifically
focuses on the question of whether or not a defamation defendant specifically “targeted”
an individual or individuals within the forum state.75 Such an approach would “seek to
identify the intentions of the parties and to assess the steps taken to either enter or avoid a
particular jurisdiction.”76 As of 2005, the Third,77 Fourth,78 and Ninth79 federal circuits

71

317 F.3d at 476 (“In short, this was not about Texas. If the article had a geographic focus it was
Washington, D.C.”).
72
465 U.S. at 788–89.
73
317 F.3d at 473.
74
315 F.3d 256 (2002).
75
See Michael Geist, Is There a There There? Toward Greater Certainty for Internet Jurisdiction, 16
BERKELEY TECH. L.J., 1345, 1345–46 (2001) (“Targeting would [] lessen the reliance on effects-based
analysis, the source of considerable uncertainty since Internet activity can ordinarily be said to create some
effects in most jurisdictions.”); Henry H. Perrit, Jr., Economic and Other Barriers to Electronic Commerce,
21 U. PA. J. OF INT’L ECON. L. 563, 573 (2000) (“The concept of targeting is the best solution to the
theoretical challenge presented by difficulties in localizing conduct in Internet markets.”).
76
Geist, supra note 75, at 1345.
77
See Toys “R” Us, Inc. v. Step Two, S.A., 318 F.3d 446, 452 (3rd Cir. 2003) (holding jurisdiction can be
found where it can be shown that a defendant “purposely availed” itself of conducting activity in the forum
state, by directly targeting its website to the state, knowingly interacting with residents of the forum state
via its website, or through sufficient related contacts”).
78
See ALS Scan, Inc. v. Digital Serv. Consultants, Inc., 293 F.3d 707, 714 (4th Cir. 2002) (finding
jurisdiction is proper when a defendant “(1) directs electronic activity into the State, (2) with the manifested
intent of engaging in business or other interactions within the State, and (3) that activity creates, in a person
within the State, a potential cause of action cognizable in the State’s courts”).
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have incorporated a targeting inquiry into their Internet jurisdiction analyses. One Fourth
Circuit opinion, Young v. New Haven Advocate,80 best illustrates the operation of such an
approach in the Internet defamation context.
In Young, a Virginia prison warden brought a suit in Virginia against two
Connecticut newspapers for a series of allegedly defamatory articles regarding the
transfer of Connecticut prisoners to a Virginia facility.81

These articles described

allegations made by prisoners of abusive guards and reported a class action suit that had
been filed regarding abject conditions at the prison.82 In one column, the Virginia prison
in question was characterized as a “cut-rate gulag”.83 In addition, one column reported a
Connecticut senator’s consternation over the presence of Confederate Civil War
memorabilia in the warden’s office.84 All of these articles appeared on the newspapers’
Internet websites and were easily accessible to residents of Virginia via the website.
The Young court rejected the plaintiff’s suggestion that his case fit under the
effects-test rubric of Calder and his argument that jurisdiction existed in Virginia “simply
because the newspapers posted articles on their Internet websites . . . and he could feel
the effects of any libel in Virginia.”85 The court asserted that “Calder does not sweep
that broadly” and instead seized on the language in Calder that stresses the importance of

79

See Bancroft & Masters Inc. v. Augusta Nat’l Inc., 223 F.3d 1082 (9th Cir. 2000) (stating jurisdiction is
created “when the defendant is alleged to have engaged in wrongful conduct targeted at a plaintiff whom
the defendant knows to be a resident of the forum state”).
80
315 F.3d 256 (2002).
81
Id. at 259.
82
Id.
83
Id.
84
Id.
85
Id. at 261.
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“look[ing] at whether the defendant has expressly aimed or directed its conduct toward
the forum state.”86
In concluding that the defendant newpapers did not, in fact, aim or direct their
conduct toward Virginia, the Young court underscored facts indicating that Connecticut,
rather than Virginia readers, were the presumptive audience for its articles. It pointed out
that most of the advertising in both the physical and Internet versions of the newspapers
was clearly aimed at Connecticut residents.87 Also, the vast majority of all physical
copies of both newspapers were distributed in Connecticut: One newspaper was a free
newspaper distributed only in Connecticut and the other reported only eight Virginia
subscribers.88 Finally, the websites of both newspapers offered features only of interest
to Connecticut viewers such as local weather and traffic links, links to the University of
Connecticut, and reviews of local establishments and events (e.g., “The Best of New
Haven”).89

Based on a consideration of these facts, the Young court found that the

defendant newspapers “did not post materials on the Internet with the manifest intent of
targeting Virginia readers.”90 Accordingly, jurisdiction was not created.
4. Intention, Purpose, Directedness: Unifying Themes in the U.S. Approach to Internet
Defamation Jurisdiction
Though sometimes regarded as inconsistent,91 all three American approaches to
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See Patrick J. Borchers, The Consequences of a Non-Rule Approach to Internet Jurisdiction, 98 N.W. U.
L. Rev. 473, 473 (“One might think that by now there would have emerged a clear rule on whether the
target can sue at home or not. However, there is no clear rule; in fact, there is not even really a clear
majority position.”).
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the question of jurisdiction in Internet defamation cases adhere to a minimum contacts
standard of constitutional due process. That standard, so elaborately articulated by the
Supreme Court in the sixty or so years since International Shoe, remains tied to a
deceptively simple question: When is it reasonable and fair to hale a defendant into a
court in a forum state?92

At a bare minimum, the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence

suggests that a defendant has “fair warning” that he could be subject to jurisdiction in a
forum state when he or she engages in purposeful activities directed at the forum state.93
The various approaches to Internet jurisprudence represent variations on this theme of
purpose or intentionality. Zippo: “When an entity intentionally reaches beyond its
boundaries to conduct business with foreign residents, the exercise of specific jurisdiction
is proper.”94 Calder: “[J]urisdiction over petitioners in California is proper because of
their intentional conduct in Florida calculated to cause injury to respondent in
California.”95 Young: “Because the newspapers did not intentionally direct Internet
activity to Virginia, jurisdiction fails on that ground.”
Admittedly, the question of intentionality is a difficult one, but the view that mere
presence on the Internet does not rise to the level of intentional, purposeful behavior is
coalescing in American Internet jurisdiction jurisprudence.96 Indeed, if a defendant's
mere presence on the Internet “were sufficient to establish personal jurisdiction, “a
defendant would be subjected to jurisdiction on a worldwide basis and the personal
92

See Michael L. Russell, Back to the Basics: Resisting Novel and Extreme Approaches to the Law of
Personal Jurisdiction and the Internet, 30 U. MEM. L. REV. 157, 177 (1999) (discussing reasonableness
and fairness of asserting jurisdiction in the Internet context).
93
Burger King, 471 U.S. at 473 (Where a forum seeks to assert specific jurisdiction over an out-of-state
defendant who has not consented to suit there, this “fair warning” requirement is satisfied if the defendant
has “purposefully directed” his activities at residents of the forum.”) (quoting Keeton v. Hustler Magazine,
Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 774 (1984).
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jurisdiction requirements as they currently exist would be eviscerated.”97 As the next
section will argue, there is an approach to personal jurisdiction developing internationally
that would do just that.
III. THE DOW JONES APPROACH TO INTERNET DEFAMATION
A. Dow Jones & Company, Inc. v. Gutnick98
In 2000, prominent Australian businessman Joseph “Diamond Joe” Gutnick
became aware of an article, published on Barrons Online that alleged he was using
charities to artificially inflate the value of low-priced stocks in the United States.99 The
article also alleged Gutnick had ties to other businessmen who had been convicted or
charged with fraud.100 Gutnick promptly filed a suit for defamation against Dow Jones,
the owner of Barrons Online in Australia, where he was resident and where he claimed
the injury to his reputation had occurred.101 By the time the case worked its way up to
the Australian High Court, U.S. publishers had recognized its significance as the first
case raising the issue of international defamation liability for Internet publications.
Several of them, including The New York Times, The Washington Post, The Associated
Press, Reuters, and Cable News Network (CNN)., intervened on behalf of Dow Jones,
arguing that a ruling in favor of Gutnick would allow publishers to be sued anywhere in
the world.102 There efforts would be unsuccessful. In 2002, the Australian High Court
ruled against Dow Jones, sparking off an international controversy.103
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1. The Procedural Conflict
a. Place of Publication and the Australian Jurisdictional Analysis
The threshold question of jurisdiction was obviously one of great significance.
How would the Australian High Court determine whether it could exercise jurisdiction
over a large foreign media enterprise headquartered in the United States, doing most of
its business in the U.S., and responsible for publications primarily directed at U.S.
audiences? Under international law, a domestic court is subject to limitations on its
authority to adjudicate in cases that involve foreign interests or activities.104 There are no
bright-line rules of international law, however, circumscribing spheres of national
jurisdiction.105 Rather, international law leaves States wide discretion to decide when an
exercise of jurisdiction is appropriate based on generally accepted principles.106
Nevertheless, courts generally exercise moderation and restraint in invoking jurisdiction

approval of the High Court's ‘obvious’ rule to derision for the shortsighted protectionism of the Australian
‘Kangaroo Court.’”).
104
Traditionally, three kinds of jurisdiction are distinguished as a matter of international law: jurisdiction to
prescribe, or legislative jurisdiction; jurisdiction to adjudicate, or judicial jurisdiction; and jurisdiction to
enforce, or executive jurisdiction. BARRY E. CARTER & PHILLIP R. TRIMBLE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 726
(2D ED. 1995); Australia’s jurisdiction to prescribe defamatory publication and enforce its defamation law
was not disputed in this case. Rather, the jurisdictional analysis centered on the question of the High
Court’s jurisdiction to adjudicate. Jurisdiction to adjudicate is defined as “a State’s authority to
subject persons or things to the process of its courts or administrative tribunals, whether in civil or in
criminal proceedings, whether or not the State is a party to the proceedings.” RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE U.S. 401(B) (1987)
105
See id. at 401 cmt. a. (“This section and the chapters that follow do not divide exercises of authority by a
state into discrete conceptual categories. Rather, they identify different aspects of the exercise of authority
that, because they employ different means and have different consequences, have led to different rules of
international law.”).
106
Four traditional bases for jurisdiction are generally recognized in international law. These are (1) the
territoriality principle, according to which the place where an offense is committed-in whole or in partdetermines jurisdiction; (2) the nationality principle, which looks to the nationality or national character of
the person committing the offense to establish jurisdiction; (3) the effects principle, focusing on the direct
and foreseeable effects of conduct within the territory of the forum and (4) the protective principle, which
applies when a national or international interest of the forum is injured by the offender. See CARTER &
TRIMBLE, supra note 101, at 755. The Australian High Court’s analysis implicitly invokes the “effects
principle” as a basis for jurisdiction: “Activities that have effects beyond the jurisdiction in which they are
done may properly be the concern of the legal systems in each place.” [2002] HCA 56, at para. 24.
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over cases that have a foreign element in order to avoid undue encroachment on the
jurisdiction of other States.107
In both the Australian High Court’s opinion, as well as in the opinion below, the
jurisdictional analysis focused on the question of where the allegedly defamatory
statement had been “published.”108 Dow Jones argued that the article in question had
been “published” when it was uploaded to Dow Jones servers, located in the United
States.109 In making this argument, it urged the court to adopt a “single publication rule”,
the rule employed in the U.S., which states that any edition of a book, newspaper, radio,
or television broadcast is a single publication for which only one action for damages can
be maintained.110

Under the Australian common law “multiple publication” rule, by

contrast, each observation of a defamatory statement creates a separate cause of action
and creates a new location in which the action may be brought.111 Under a single
publication rule, Dow Jones argued, the place of publication was New Jersey and only
New Jersey, where Dow Jones’ servers were located and where material was uploaded to
107

See Wilske & Schiller, International Jurisdiction in Cyberspace: Who May Regulate the Internet?, 50
FED. COMM. L.J. 117, 127 (“A State that exercises jurisdiction in an overly self-centered way not only
contravenes international law, but it can also disturb the international order and produce political, legal, and
economic reprisals.”)
108
[2001] VSC 305 at para. 13 (“[C]consideration of the jurisdiction issue . . . means the question of the
place of Internet publication.”). [2002] HCA 56 passim.
109
[2002] HCA 56 at para. 18 (“The principal burden of the argument advanced by Dow Jones on the
hearing of the appeal in this Court was that articles published on Barron's Online were published in South
Brunswick, New Jersey, when they became available on the servers which it maintained at that place.”).
110
As stated in the Restatement of Torts 577A, the rule is as follows:
(3) Any one edition of a book or newspaper, or any one radio or television broadcast, exhibition of a
motion picture or similar aggregate communication is a single publication.
(4) As to any single publication,
(a) only one action for damages can be maintained;
(b) all damages suffered in all jurisdictions can be recovered in the one action; and
(c) a judgment for or against the plaintiff upon the merits of any action for damages bars any other action
for damages between the same parties in all jurisdictions.
111
There is a separate publication (and thus a separate cause of action) in relation to each copy delivered to
a reader. If a newspaper circulates 100,000 copies of the one edition (defamatory of the plaintiff), he has
available to him at least 100,000 causes of action. The "single publication" rule adopted in the United
States, whereby a plaintiff is given only one cause of action for each entire edition of the newspaper, has
not been adopted in this country.
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its website.112

To the contrary, Gutnick argued that publication of the article only

occurred “when it [was] made intelligible or manifest to a third party by showing it or
making it comprehensible,”113 i.e, whenever and wherever it was received and read. In
conjunction with the multiple publication rule, this would mean that a publisher would be
potentially liable for separate torts each time a defamatory article was viewed on its
website, which, of course, could occur virtually anywhere in the world.114
b. The Victorian Supreme Court Opinion115
Dow Jones urged the Victorian Supreme Court to adopt the single publication rule
as a matter of fairness and public policy.

It argued that a rule determining that

publication on the Internet occurs whenever and wherever it was read would not only be
unfair to publishers—forcing them to litigate in a “multitude of jurisdictions”116—but
would also have a chilling effect on Internet speech. Claiming that adoption of such a
rule would inevitably lead to an increase in litigation, it reasoned that information
providers “would become more cautious . . . reducing the uninhibited communication and
circulation of information to an exceptionally low level.”117 The court dismissed this
claim as speculative— “asserted but not established by evidence . . . .”118
As to the unfairness of subjecting publishers to litigation in multiple jurisdictions,
the court responded in a passage that amounts to an outright challenge to a perceived U.S.
legal hegemony:
112
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The applicant's argument that it would be unfair for the publisher to have to
litigate in the multitude of jurisdictions in which its statements are downloaded
and read, must be balanced against the world-wide inconvenience caused to
litigants, from Outer Mongolia to the Outer Barcoo, frequently not of notable
means, who would at enormous expense and inconvenience have to embark upon
the formidable task of suing in the USA, with its different fee and costs structures
and where the libel laws are, in many respects, tilted in favour of defendants, or, if
you will, in favour of the constitutional free speech concepts and rights developed
in the USA which originated in the liberal construction by the courts of the First
Amendment.119
This passage is emblematic of the lower court’s resistance to the notion that U.S.
free speech norms merited any special consideration in its decision to exercise
jurisdiction or not.

In fact, the Victorian Supreme Court clearly saw merit in

counterbalancing the presumed legal hegemony of the United States and its laws “tilted”
in favor of free speech. This inclination can be detected even more clearly in the court’s
rejection of Dow Jones argument that a rule which places jurisdiction for Internet
defamation in the forum in which the article is accessed would create an insularity in the
law contrary to Australian interests.120 Blanching at any suggestion that such a claim was
anything more than a “self-indulgent” submission, “reeking of overstatement,”121 the
court dismissed it completely. It countered: “The point simply is that if you do publish a
libel justiciable in another country with its own laws (not mere copies of the U.S. law as
the defendant's submissions appear to favour, perhaps because they are tilted in favour of
the defendant), then you may be liable . . . .”.122 Consequently, the Victorian Supreme
Court found no reason to refrain from exercising jurisdiction.
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c. The Australian High Court Opinion123
Dow Jones appealed the decision and the Australian High Court affirmed the
decision of the Victorian Supreme Court. The High Court, like the court below, focused
its jurisdictional analysis on the question of where the allegedly defamatory statements
had been published.124

The High Court, however, unlike the lower court, clearly

recognized the interrelatedness of the jurisdictional and choice of law questions in this
case.125

According to the High Court, where the parties or events have some connection

with a jurisdiction outside Australia, the law of the place of the wrong controls.126 Thus,
the jurisdiction in which the defamation was “published” would control the law to be
applied.127 Conversely, if the defamation was “published” outside of Australia, then
foreign law would be applied. Australia would thus become an inconvenient forum and
the case would be dismissed.128
Dow Jones again urged the court to consider the merits of adopting a single
publication rule, arguing that an Internet publisher should be governed by the
law of the place where it maintains its servers.129 The alternative, it claimed,
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would force a publisher to “take account of the law of every country on earth, for there
were no boundaries which a publisher could effectively draw to prevent anyone,
anywhere, downloading the information it put on its web server.”130
The High Court, like the lower court, rejected this argument as speculative,
calling it a claim with “a greater appearance of certainty than it would have in fact.”131
Furthermore, it reaffirmed the conclusions of the lower court, holding that the true
concern of defamation is damage to the plaintiff ’s reputation, and that there is no damage
until the defamatory information is in comprehensible form in a place where the
plaintiff’s reputation may be damaged.132 Thus, the court held that information on the
Internet is published where the information is downloaded.133
d. Comparative Application of the U.S. Approach to Jurisdiction to Gutnick
Noticeably absent from either opinion of the Australian courts was any
consideration of Dow Jones’ intentions in the matter at hand. As outlined above, a U.S.
court would be required to make that determination through an analysis of minimum
contacts, focusing on the extent to which Dow Jones engaged in purposeful, intentional
conduct directed toward Australia. The lower court does acknowledge this fact, citing
Calder for the proposition that U.S. Courts “would generally exercise jurisdiction in
defamation actions over defendants domiciled outside the jurisdiction of the court only
where the defendant's conduct targeted the forum.”134 The court makes no commentary
on this point, perhaps indicating by its silence that it considered the apparent conflict of
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laws to be an irreconcilable one. Curiously, however, the High Court also cites Calder
for an inapposite proposition in favor of a determination that jurisdiction in Australia was
appropriate.

It asserts that in Calder “personal jurisdiction over a defendant was

exercised based on the defendant's operation of a Website accessible in the forum where
harm was caused to the plaintiff in the forum.”135
This odd juxtaposition of propositions amounts to a misuse of Calder. While
Calder does stand for both propositions, they are conjunctive rather than disjunctive.
While the placement of the effects of a defamatory statement may be a valid factor in
considering jurisdiction, the Calder opinion never suggests that it is a substitute for or
alternative to the basic due process analysis of purposeful availment. In fact, in coming
to its conclusion that California’s exercise of jurisdiction was valid, Calder emphasized
the deliberate actions of the defendants: “The writers’ actions were expressly aimed at
California,” the Court observed, “and they knew that the brunt of the injury would be felt
by [the actress] in the State in which she lives and works and in which the National
Enquirer has its largest circulation.”136

By contrast, Dow Jones insisted that Barrons

Online was “indelibly American, written by Americans for Americans interested in the
stock market and its affairs” and in no way directed toward Australians.137 Rather than
engage in any analysis of this apparent lack of intent or purpose to , the High Court
simply countered with the observation that “Mr. Gutnick is indelibly Victorian,
connected with no other place and that any documentation or evidence concerning the
matter will all be found in Victoria.”138
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The fact that the number of Australian subscribers to Barrons Online was
negligible would also be significant under a U.S. approach to Internet jurisdiction. Out of
550, 000 subscribers, only 1,700 (less than one-half of one percent) were located within
Australia and a mere couple hundred were sold in the forum state of Victoria.139 Under
Zippo, the fact that Dow Jones actually earned revenue from these subscriptions and
assigned subscribers passwords to access their sites would mean that the Barrons Online
could not be described as entirely passive.140 In addition, the fact that the number of
Victorian subscribers was small would not alone be dispositive.141

However, Revell

suggests that the fact that Australians were not the “principal users” of the website should
be regarded as a highly relevant factor for purposes of a Zippo analysis.142
Finally, Dow Jones contact with Australia would clearly fall short of the
minimum contacts standard put forth for Internet defamation cases in Young. Young
looked to the overall configuration and content of the website rather than the subject
matter of the allegedly defamatory article to determine whether jurisdiction existed.143 In
Gutnick, as in Young, there was no evidence that the defendant’s website was configured
in such a way that its content could reasonably be construed as targeted toward an
audience in the forum state.144 Indeed, it wouldn’t make sense commercially for Barrons
to tailor content on its website for the tiny percentage of its customer base represented by
Australians.
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Counsel for Dow Jones emphasized the “American-ness” of Barrons Online
website content: Its subject matter was the American stock market, its readers were
presumably investors interested in the American stock market, and Gutnick’s activities
were very much relevant to the American stock market insofar as his alleged misconduct
would affect investor conduct in publicly held enterprises with which he might be
associated.145 Similarly, the Young court recognized that the “Connecticut-ness” of the
defendants’ websites.146 The fact that the defendants’ website was accessible in Virginia
would provide a basis for jurisdiction in Virginia only if they, in the court's words,
“manifest an intent to target and focus on Virginia readers.”147 Dow Jones clearly did not
manifest an intent to target Australian readers. Thus, under Young, a U.S. court would be
compelled to decline to assert jurisdiction.
2. The Substantive Conflict
The fact that the High Court in Gutnick elected to exercise jurisdiction over Dow
Jones brought the substantive issue of free speech norms to the fore. The Australian High
Court might be commended for recognizing that the case before at its core reflected a
substantive conflict of free speech values.

At the outset of its opinion, the court

acknowledged
the obvious point that the law of defamation seeks to strike a balance between, on
the one hand, society's interest in freedom of speech and the free exchange of
information and ideas and . . . an individual's interest in maintaining his or her
reputation. The way in which those interests are balanced differs from society to
society.148
The conclusion that the High Court came to, however, regarding the appropriate
145
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balance of these values, however, is one incompatible with American First Amendment
values. U.S. courts have interpreted the First Amendment’s prohibitions on restrictions
of freedom of speech very broadly.

This broad reading reflects the “profound

commitment” stridently to the principle “that debate on public issues should be
uninhibited, robust, and wide-open, and that it may well include vehement, caustic, and
sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and public officials.”149 This firm
commitment to liberal free speech norms has resulted in substantive differences between
the law of defamation in the United States and common law jurisdictions such as
Australia and England.150 Most notably, in these latter jurisdictions there is no special
protection for statements made about “public figures” such as Mr. Gutnick.151 This
critical difference between U.S. and English/Australian law is the result of the landmark
Supreme Court opinion New York Times v. Sullivan.152
Sullivan protects the right of the press to criticize public officials, by requiring
that public officials suing for defamation meet a higher standard of “actual malice” to
prevail.153

Actual malice refers to “knowledge that a statement was false or with

reckless disregard of whether it was false or not.”154 In further rulings, the Court has
clarified that the standard of actual malice applies very broadly to any person who is a
“public figure,” including politicians, celebrities, business persons, or anyone else who is
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in the public eye.155 These are persons who “have assumed roles of special prominence
in the affairs of society . . . [that] occupy positions of such persuasive power and
influence that they are deemed public figures for all purposes.”156 The “actual malice”
standard makes U.S. law decidedly “tilted” in favor of defendants and free speech in
general, as the Victorian Supreme Court clearly recognized.157
In addition, in the United States, the burden of proof is on the plaintiff to show
that a statement was defamatory and false.158 Furthermore, the burden of proof is on a
public figure plaintiff to prove actual malice by a standard of “clear and convincing”
evidence.159 By contrast, the common law rule still followed by Australian and English
courts presumes the falsity of an allegedly defamatory statement and requires that the
defendant prove that the material was true.160
Because of First Amendment-derived protections, Dow Jones would likely prevail
in a defamation suit in the United States. Based on his widespread notoriety, Mr. Gutnick
would clearly be considered a public figure in the United States161 and would be subject
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to a heavy burden of showing that the statements made concerning him were false and
accompanied by “actual malice”. In Australia, Dow Jones did not have this critical free
speech protection, nor will any other publisher sued for defamation, a fact that accounts
for the great dismay felt by American publishers162 as well as legal commentators163
committed to strong free protection for the American press. In November of 2004, Dow
Jones threw in the towel and settled its suit with Mr. Gutnick out of court, agreeing to pay
him $180,000 and an additional $400,000 in costs.164 The outcome in Gutnick as well as
Dow Jones’ settlement may have set a dangerous precedent, one that will unfold as more
and more courts struggle with the issue of international Internet defamation actions.165
B. Potential Extension of Gutnick: Harrods Limited v. Dow Jones & Co., Inc.166
This dismay can only have increased with evidence, presented in the form of a
procedural ruling in the English case of Harrods Limited v. Dow Jones & Co., Inc... That
case bears similarities to Dow Jones v. Gutnick that go beyond the obvious fact that Dow
Jones is the defendant in both. Harrods, like Gutnick, involves a suit for Internet
defamation. Dow Jones published an article on April 1, 2001 in both the print and online
versions of its subsidiary newspaper, The Wall Street Journal.167 This article was written
and published as a result of its inability to recognize that a phony press release issued by
162
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Harrods Department Store the day before was, in fact, an April Fool’s joke.168 The press
release announced that Mohamed Al Fayed, owner of Harrods, planned to “float”
Harrods.169
The word “float” was a play on words, intended to suggest that Al Fayed was
going to take the company public, i.e. “float” its stock. In fact, it referred to Al Fayed’s
plans to build a ship version of Harrods, which would be moored on the Thames River.
Get it?—A “floating” Harrods?

The Wall Street Journal did not get it and initially

reported the story quite literally.170 It eventually caught on, however, and perhaps still
burning from having been duped, it published another more caustic story about Harrods a
few days later. This story, entitled “The Enron of Britain?”, revealed the joke and added
“If Harrods . . . ever goes public, investors would be wise to question its every
disclosure.”171 Piqued by this unflattering comparison to Enron, the notorious emblem of
corporate misconduct and mismanagement, Fayed and Harrods sued for defamation in
England.
Dow Jones responded by asking a U.S. district court in New York to issue a
declaratory judgment protecting it from any UK judgment against and an injunction
barring Harrods from pursuing its defamation action—not only in the UK, but in any
other foreign jurisdiction.172 Dow Jones argued that an action for defamation based on
the news article would not survive constitutional scrutiny in the United States because the
publication represented only “non-actionable expression of opinion based on true
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statements.”173 British defamation law, Dow Jones argued, offered far less protection to
publishers, and was thus “plainly antithetical to historic rules, traditions and policies
established to protect free speech and freedom of the press in the United States.”174
The court refused Dow Jones’ request, however, explaining that as a matter of
international comity, it would be inappropriate for a U.S. court to attempt to preempt175
the UK defamation claim—let alone any future claims that Harrods might elect to pursue
in other jurisdictions around the world.176 On the other hand, the court stated that it
would have “little hesitation” in issuing a declaration of non-recognition of an
existing UK court judgment against Dow Jones.177 In doing so, the court reaffirmed a
commitment to U.S. free speech norms, stating “the United States has a profound interest
in fostering its broad concept of First Amendment freedoms, and safeguarding the freest
exercise of those fundamental rights within the United States by all persons accorded the
protection of American law.”178
After the U.S. District Court refused to issue a declaratory judgment, the matter
reached the High Court of Justice in London. The High Court noted that the allegedly
defamatory article did not appear in the European edition of the Wall Street Journal, the
edition that reached most British readers.179 It cited evidence that only ten copies were
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sent to subscribers in the U.K. from the U.S..180 As for the online edition, the court
conceded that the evidence “discloses a very small number of ‘hits’ on the article as
published on the web” and contrasted this evidence with the fact that The Wall Street
Journal has a national distribution within the United States of approximately 1.8 million
copies.181
One might expect these factors to weigh heavily in favor of declining jurisdiction,
as they would under an American minimum contacts analysis. However, the London
High Court, citing Gutnick as one authority, concluded that “the publications . . . have
taken place within this jurisdiction. That applies both to the small number of copies of
The Wall Street Journal received by subscribers here and also to the apparently limited
number of hits emanating from this jurisdiction on the relevant page of the web site.”182
Though the case has yet to go to trial, this procedural ruling means that Dow Jones will
be subject to the English law of defamation, which like Australian defamation law, lacks
the protections outlined above for speech about public figures.183

C. Implications of the Dow Jones Decisions
Defense counsel for Dow Jones in Gutnick argued strenuously for a narrow,
speech-protecting rule in the “age of globalization,”184 an argument that the Victorian
Supreme Court dismissed as merely self-serving185 and the Australian High Court found
ultimately unpersuasive.186 While clearly self-serving, this argument was still a valid
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one, and arguably prescient. The Internet truly is a revolutionary tool for dissemination
of information, one that allows content to be received anywhere and everywhere that an
Internet connection is available.187 As a result, individuals nearly anywhere in the world
individuals could access the material placed by Dow Jones on its web servers.188
Standing on its own, Gutnick is flawed in its failure to recognize that old jurisdictional
rules are ill-suited for addressing the unique challenge posed by a radical new physicallyunconstrained medium for communication. As the U.S. Supreme Court has recognized,
the Internet is “a unique and wholly new medium of worldwide human
communication.”189
If the basic ruling of Gutnick—that publication of a defamatory communication
occurs where it is received— is followed to its logical end, then Internet publishers could
be held liable, again, anywhere and everywhere.190 It is true that the risk of publishers
having to defend defamation actions around the world is somewhat mitigated by
significant practical obstacles to such a development. For example, as discussed infra
Part IV, plaintiffs are unlikely to go to the expense of suing for defamation unless any
judgment they obtain is capable of being enforced in a place where the defendant has
assets. Nevertheless, it is entirely plausible to conclude that Internet publishers, facing
the prospect of increased liability, will make adjustments to reduce their exposure. Self-
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censorship is one of the surest, most practical means of accomplishing this objective and
American media outlets have responded to the threat of liability in such a manner in the
past.191 Thus, the notion that a chill on free speech could occur as a result of Gutnick is
not just a “high-minded concept” or “self-indulgent submission”192 but a very real
possibility.

Long before Gutnick, one commentator noted that “perhaps the most

complex threat to the new communications technology may come from governmental
entities that are not subject to the First Amendment.”193 To the extent countries outside
the United States take the position that they have jurisdiction over any communication
that is downloaded within their borders, Internet content providers may find that they
cannot rely upon the relatively high level of protection they enjoy in the United States.
IV. REFUSING ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN JUDGMENTS ADVERSE TO U.S. PUBLIC
POLICY: A POSSIBLE ANTIDOTE TO THE DOW JONES PRECEDENT?
As suggested by the U.S. District Court’s opinion in Dow Jones v. Harrods,
American courts may still have a role to play in the unfolding conflict of transnational
free speech norms.194 American publishers generally have the majority of their assets in
the U.S. and victorious defamation plaintiffs abroad can only access these assets through
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a ruling by an American court agreeing to enforce the judgment.195 Enforceability is
treated as a question of state law, and over thirty states have adopted versions of the
Uniform Foreign Money-Judgments Act, which provides that a foreign money judgment
“that is final and conclusive and enforceable where rendered . . . is conclusive between
the parties . . . .”196

This general rule of enforceability is subject to limitations,

however, and one exception, the “public policy” exception represents a sort of rear guard
action against the erosion of U.S. free speech protections by foreign defamation
judgments.197 This exception allows courts to refuse enforcement when the cause of
action or claim for relief on which the judgment rests is “repugnant to the public policy of
[the enforcing] state.”198

A. Bachchan v. India Abroad Publications, Inc and Telnikoff v. Matusevich
U.S. courts have refused to enforce foreign defamation judgments determined to
be inconsistent with the constitutional protections of New York Times v. Sullivan and its
progeny.

Two leading cases—Bachchan v. India Abroad Publications, Inc.199and

Telnikoff v. Matusevich200—suggest possible responses to an adverse ruling in either Dow
Jones defamation cases by American courts. In Bachchan, a New York state court
refused to enforce an English defamation judgment against the operator of a New York
news wire service, declaring that “the protection to free speech and the press embodied in
[the First Amendment] would be seriously jeopardized by the entry of foreign libel
judgments granted pursuant to standards deemed appropriate in England but considered
195
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antithetical to the protections afforded the press by the U.S. Constitution.”201 Likewise,
in Matusevich, the Court of Appeals of Maryland declared that an English defamation
judgment could not be enforced in Maryland because “the principles governing
defamation actions under English law . . . are so contrary to Maryland defamation law,
and to the policy of freedom of the press underlying Maryland law.”202

B. Yahoo! Inc. v. LICRA
In addition, Yahoo! Inc. v. La Ligue Contre le Racisme et L'Antisemitisme
(LICRA),203 represents strong authority at the federal level for refusing to enforce a
foreign judgment inconsistent with American free speech norms. In that case, a U.S.
district court in California refused to declare enforceable a French ruling against the
popular website Yahoo! for allowing the display of Nazi memorabilia on its website in
violation of French law. In doing so, it recognized that “the French order's content and
viewpoint-based regulation of the web pages and auction site on Yahoo.com . . . clearly
would be inconsistent with the First Amendment if mandated by a court in the United
States.”204 Further, the court rejected any notion that principles of comity between
nations obliged it to recognize the French judgment: “Absent a body of law that
establishes international standards with respect to speech on the Internet . . . the principle
of comity is outweighed by the Court’s obligation to uphold the First Amendment.”205
Collectively, these cases provide a powerful rationale for refusing to enforce
adverse judgments on the merits (should they be adverse) against Dow Jones. The
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various differences in the substantive law of defamation between America on the one
hand and Australia and England on the other, are not insignificant. The absence of a
requirement of an “actual malice” showing alone is enough to make the common law of
defamation embraced in Australia and England fundamentally incompatible with the First
Amendment as modified by Sullivan. Thus, Dow Jones or a similarly situated defendant
may ultimately find relief in a domestic court from an adverse ruling abroad.

C. U.S. Courts May Prevent the Further Erosion of Internet Free Speech Norms
Likewise, proponents of robust free speech/free press protections may take solace
in the possibility that their interests will be vindicated by a court following the mandates
of the First Amendment. The need for judicial protection of First Amendment values
internationally is underscored by the apparent lack of a viable political solution. Though
international conventions addressing free speech norms on the Internet exist, these
conventions are restrictive from a U.S. perspective206 and no such agreement has been
made concerning free speech norms as applied to defamation.

Moreover, such an

international political solution is arguably unrealistic and undesirable from an American
free speech perspective. Even assuming any consensus could be created internationally
concerning general standards of free speech, these standards are unlikely to guarantee the
exceptionally high level of free press protection that exists in the United States.207 As the
two Dow Jones and Yahoo! cases make clear, even the most liberal of Western
democracies do not share ideals of free speech as expansive as those espoused in the
United States.

Furthermore, a significant number of non-Western, non-democratic
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nations embrace state censorship of free speech on the Internet208 and are unlikely to find
American arguments to the contrary persuasive, at least in the short term.
In the absence of a political solution, legal scholars have begun to more
aggressively call upon national courts to provide a solution.209 As Matusevich, Bachnan,
and Yahoo! indicate, at least a few American courts have been willing to “step[] into the
gap, using judicial interpretations of jurisdiction and judicial comity to champion [the
American] approach to balancing competing norms on transnational speech.” Of course,
no U.S. court enjoys more prestige or commands more respect internationally than the
U.S. Supreme Court. Although the Supreme Court has not yet had an opportunity to
champion American free speech / free press norms in the context of international Internet
defamation, remarks by Justice Scalia and Breyer suggest that perhaps they are
sharpening their swords for just such an occasion. In the course of an informal discussion
held at American University on the use of foreign law precedent in Supreme Court
jurisprudence,210 the following exchange occurred:
Questioner (Referring to Dow Jones v. Gutnick): Do U.S. courts cooperate with
illiberal policies by enforcing foreign judgments against Americans for speech
that would definitely be protected here in the U.S?
Justice Scalia That’s a very interesting question, uh . . . (pause, laughter). What
do you think the answer is? (smirking, more laughter)
Questioner: The answer is yes. I’ll send you one of my law students as a clerk.
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Justice Scalia: It really is a great problem. We haven’t been confronted with a
case involving it yet, but when the case comes up we will indeed . . .
Justice Breyer (interrupting): We will give it our serious consideration (laughter).
Justice Scalia: The one thing you can be sure is we will get it right (more
laughter).
The impression one is left with upon viewing this exchange is that the “right
answer”, at least as Justices Scalia and Breyer are concerned, is to refuse to recognize any
foreign judgment deemed incompatible with U.S. free speech norms. It may only be a
matter of time before the U.S. Supreme Court has an opportunity to give more substance
to this impression.
V. CONCLUSION
Dow Jones v. Gutnick

has thrown into relief the difficult procedural and

substantive issues the U.S. will need to resolve as Internet publishing becomes more and
more important as a medium for mass, global communication. The consequences of
failing to address these challenges could be considerable.

The mere prospect of

expensive litigation in multiple, far flung jurisdictions and exposure to inconsistent
regulation is likely to have a substantial “chilling effect” on what may well be “the most
participatory marketplace of mass speech that this country—and indeed the world—has
yet seen.”211 Risk-averse Internet publishers will need to adhere to the most restrictive
international standards of free speech to avoid liability. Furthermore, if a publisher has to
consider the laws of Australia (or Singapore, China, Saudi Arabia, etc . . .) when
publishing, his or her level of speech protection is reduced to that of the potential forum
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state.

As Dow Jones's general counsel observed, “it creates a kind of tyranny of the

lowest common denominator and . . . inhibits free speech.”212
Finally, perhaps the most damning observation regarding defamation lawsuits in
foreign courts is that they often represent an “end run” around the First Amendment and
New York Times v. Sullivan, as few foreign jurisdictions recognize the heightened
protections against charges of defamation guaranteed by that case in the United States.213
These protections will be greatly diminished in value unless they are transplanted from
the printed to electronic medium, which soon could be a dominant mode of news
distribution. Thus, as American publishers push into the frontiers of Internet publishing,
U.S. courts should wield New York Times v. Sullivan as both sword and shield to protect
them against free speech norms antithetical to our own “profound national commitment
to the principle debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open.”214
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